We develop a two-sector model of monopolistic competition with a dierentiated intermediate good and variable elasticity of technological substitution. This setting proves to be well-suited to studying the nature and origins of external increasing returns. We disentangle two sources of scale economies: specialization and competition. The former depends only on how TFP varies with input diversity, while the latter is fully captured by the behavior of the elasticity of substitution across inputs. This distinction gives rise to a full characterization of the rich array of competition regimes in our model. The necessary and sucient conditions for each regime to occur are expressed in terms of the relationships between TFP and the elasticity of substitution as functions of the input diversity. Moreover, we demonstrate that, despite the folk wisdom resting on CES models, specialization economies are in general neither necessary nor sucient for external increasing returns to emerge. This highlights the profound and non-trivial role of market competition in generating agglomeration economies, endogenous growth, and other phenomena driven by scale economies.
Introduction
What happens to an economy when it gets larger (say, in terms of population)? The answer to this question is of paramount importance for understanding, for example, agglomeration economies in new economic geography, economic growth in endogenous growth theory, the home market eect in international trade, etc. To a large extent, all these phenomena are driven by external increasing returns to scale (EIRS), meaning that, following a given increase in the size of the economy, the resulting increase in the aggregate output is more than proportional. EIRS may emerge for dierent reasons and they play a fundamental role in shaping market outcomes. Specialization is among the most important sources of scale economies: more room for the division of labor is likely to boost aggregate productivity.
On the other hand, EIRS are also inherently driven by product market competition: larger markets lead to tougher competition across rms, for higher demand invites more rms, which eventually results in lower prices, lower markups, and larger rms. According to Sandmo (2011, Ch. 3) , this dichotomy has been conceptualized at least as early as by Adam Smith (1776) , who was a prominent spokesman in favor of both a deeper division of labor and freer competition. We believe, however, that the interaction between these two forces has never been systematically studied within a unied model. Indeed, in the literature such forces have been mainly analyzed independently from each other within two dierent families of models. While the consequences of specialization have been studied for the most part by means of two-sector monopolistic competition models in which the nal good sector technology displays constant elasticity of substitution (CES) across the dierentiated inputs (e.g. Ethier, 1982) 4 As a result, the joint role of specialization and competition in generating EIRS and shaping market outcomes has till now received very little attention.
What makes the understanding of the combined eect of these two forces even more intriguing is that they need not always spur aggregate production. First, according to Kremer (1993) , more complex technologies involving a larger number of production tasks and/or more dierentiated intermediate inputs may be detrimental to manufacturing activities, e.g. due to higher risks of failure. In other words, complexity diseconomies, as opposed to specialization economies, may occur. Second, recent theoretical studies of market competition show that tougher competition need not always lead to lower prices. For instance, Chen and Riordan (2007) have proposed a model of price increasing competition, while Zhelobodko et al. (2012) study both price-decreasing and price-increasing competition within a unied model.
In this paper, we look closer at the nature and sources of EIRS, and study how they aect the market outcome. To achieve our goal, we develop a two-sector model in which the production function in the nal good sector is non-specied. In this model, the specialization/complexity eect is fully captured by how TFP varies with input diversity, while the competition eect is described by the behavior of the elasticity of substitution. For this reason, in our setting these two magnitudes are treated as fundamental primitives.
Our main ndings can be summarized as follows. First, although our model generates a rich array of equilibrium behavior modes, we provide a full characterization of the impact of horizontal innovation 5 on prices, markups, and wages. To be more precise, we state necessary and sucient conditions for competition to be (i) either price-decreasing or price-increasing,
(ii) either markup-decreasing or markup-increasing, and (iii) either wage-increasing or wagedecreasing. The rst condition involves only TFP as a function of input diversity, the second is based solely on the behavior of the elasticity of substitution, while the third blends both.
Thus, we clearly map the fundamental primitives of the model into a set of the various modes of competition it generates.
Second, we endogenize the number of rms under free entry, and derive a simple necessary and sucient condition for EIRS in the nal good sector to occur. This condition is also expressed in terms of the TFP and the elasticity of substitution as functions of input diversity, and is shown to be equivalent to the wage-increasing nature of the market outcome. Furthermore, we demonstrate that specialization economies are, in general, neither necessary nor sucient for EIRS to emerge. This unexpected result stands in a sharp contrast to what happens in the CES world, where the competition eect vanishes because of the lack of impact of entry on the toughness of competition. As a consequence, under the CES specialization economies are the only source of EIRS. This explains why specialization economies have long been viewed as the dominant factor of scale economies, 6 while the impact of market competition was, in this regard, denitely underestimated. On the contrary, our result signies the non-trivial role of market competition in generating agglomeration economies, endogenous growth, and other phenomena driven by external increasing returns.
Third, we nd that the competition eect may either reinforce or weaken the impact of the specialization eect on aggregate output. This possibility has not been taken into account by horizontal R&D-based endogenous growth models (including Benassy, 1998 ).
These models focus on the positive eects of specialization, disregarding other possible eects (of either sign) which stem from an increase in the toughness of market competition. In our analysis, the way in which the competition eect interacts with the specialization eect depends on whether the inverse demand elasticity for the intermediate inputs is a decreasing or an increasing function of the number of such inputs.
In addition, our approach provides a micro-foundation of the complexity externality, which may lead to a reduction of TFP in the nal good sector in response to expanding variety of intermediate inputs. Finally, our main results hold for any production function which satises the properties of symmetry, strict quasi-concavity, and constant returns to scale (CRS), as well as having well-dened marginal products of inputs.
We believe that our contribution makes a further theoretical advancement compared to recent work on monopolistic competition with variable elasticity of substitution on the nal consumer's side, including Zhelobodko et al. (2012) . Indeed, these authors only distinguish between price-increasing and price-decreasing competition as in their model, prices and markups always move in the same direction in response to market size shocks. The reason behind the deep dierences in the results of the two settings, despite their formal similarity, is as follows. The counterpart of our TFP function in Zhelobodko et al. (2012) would be the aggregate utility measure as a function of product variety. As has been shown recently by Dhingra and Morrow (2015) , the behavior of the utility level in this type of model is crucial for welfare analysis, but is fully unrelated to the properties of free-entry equilibrium, 8 while the elasticity of substitution yields a sucient statistic for equilibrium behavior. On the contrary, what crucially matters for the market outcome in our model is the interplay between the specialization/complexity eect and the competition eect, mathematically captured through a condition expressed in terms of both the TFP and the elasticity of substitution.
This ultimately justies why we need two fundamental primitives instead of one.
Literature review. The pioneering work by Ethier (1982) is crucial for understanding the role of specialization economies in generating EIRS. Ethier's paper still remains one of the workhorse models in endogenous growth theory, as well as in urban and regional economics.
Giving full credit to this work, we nd it fair to say that the way in which the interaction between specialization and competition may generate EIRS is denitely understudied in the literature. We believe that the main reason for this resides in the widely used assumption that the technology in the nal sector has CES. This assumption is appealing as it leads to major gains in tractability. The ipside is that the equilibrium markup, which may serve as a reverse measure of the toughness of competition, remains unaected by entry, or by market-size shocks. As a consequence, the competition eect is washed out in this type of model. Both the horizontal innovation paradigm in endogenous growth theory (Grossman and Helpman, 1990 ; Krugman, 1990, Ch. 11; Romer, 1990 ; Rivera-Batiz and Romer, 1991) , and the Marshallian externalities approach, rst used by Abdel-Rahman and Fujita (1990) to study agglomeration economies at the city level, 9 are essentially based on the CES assumption. For this reason, neither of these literatures allows us to distinguish clearly between the impacts of specialization/complexity and toughness of competition on aggregate output and wages.
The present paper aims to ll this gap.
Wage inequality has recently gained new interest in international trade studies (Amiti and Davis, 2012; Helpman et al., 2010) . In this regard, our ndings suggest that this inequality may stem, at least in part, from the cross-country dierences in the interaction between 8 See also Benassy (1996) for an earlier contribution in the same line of inquiry. specialization and competition. Another issue that empirically motivates our theoretical analysis is the relationship between city size and wages. The exact form of this relationship is ambiguous, even though it is widely acknowledged by urban and regional economists that larger cities pay, on average, higher wages. Typically a log-linear relationship implied by the CES model is estimated with city-specic dummies being commonly used to improve the t (Duranton, 2014) . Our paper provides a microeconomic foundation for potentially more exible empirical strategies using non-linear specications and/or non-parametric estimation methods.
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The rest of the paper is organized as follows. Section 2 describes the model. Section 3 characterizes the equilibrium for a given number of input-producing rms. We also suggest a classication of competitive regimes in the intermediate input sector, based on the impact of entry on prices, markups, and wages. Section 4 deals with a free-entry equilibrium, and studies how the interaction between the specialization/complexity eect and the competition eect generates EIRS. Section 5 concludes.
The Model
The economy is composed by two vertically related sectors. The intermediate inputs sector 
where q = (q i ) i∈[0,n] is the vector of inputs used in production, while n stands for the number 10 Needless to say, we acknowledge that factors other than specialization economies and market competition also play a signicant role in determining the city size-wage gap. Moreover, this gap may be dierent across workers being heterogeneous in experience and/or ability (see, e.g., Baum-Snow and Pavan, 2012). However, these issues are outside the scope of the present paper.
(or, more precisely, the mass) of intermediate inputs, as well as for the number of inputproducing rms.
We make the standard assumptions about F (q). First, F (q) is concave in q, which implies that each input exhibits a diminishing marginal product (see Appendix 1 for a mathematical denition of marginal product under a continuum of inputs). Second, F (q) is positive homogenous of degree 1, so that there are CRS. Finally, we focus on symmetric production functions, i.e. such that any permutation of intermediates does not change the nal output, Y . The reason for imposing such a symmetry, which typically holds in monopolistic competition contexts, is to refrain from placing any ad hoc asymmetries on
In what follows, the duality principle will prove useful. Each F-rm seeks to minimize production costs,
treating the total output Y as given. The cost function C (p, Y ), dened as the value function of the cost minimization problem (2), provides a description of the technology dual to the one based on the production function.
11 Because of CRS, a well-dened price index for intermediate goods P (p) exists, which satises
In the CES case, the cost function and the price index are given, respectively, by
. (4) To show that our approach is exible enough to encompass a broad range of the technologies used in the literature, we proceed by providing a gallery of examples.
1. CES: variations on a theme. The three assumptions just introduced (concavity, CRS, and symmetry) are simultaneously satised by the standard CES production function:
At least two immediate extensions of (5) come to mind. First, the constant ρ in (5) may be replaced by a function of n. This is the case studied by Gali (1995) , who assumes that varieties become better technological substitutes as their number increases, i.e. ρ (n) > 0.
11 Duality theory in production, for the case of a nite set of inputs, was developed in pioneering works by Shephard (1953) and Uzawa (1964) .
Second, a multiplicative TFP term varying with n may be introduced, like in Ethier (1982) and Benassy (1998) :
2. Translog technologies. For a simple example of a non-CES technology satisfying our assumptions, consider a production function given by
which may be viewed as an innite-dimensional counterpart of the translog specication, which has been widely used in early empirical works on production functions estimation (for a survey see, e.g., Kim, 1992) . Another example of a tractable non-CES technology is given by the translog cost function (Feenstra, 2003) satisfying
3. Kimball-type production functions. Kimball (1995) represents, to the best of our knowledge, one of the very rst (and few) macroeconomic papers where a non-CES production technology is employed in sector F. Namely, the production function Y = F (q)
is implicitly dened by means of the so-called exible aggregator:
where φ(·) is an increasing, strictly concave, and suciently dierentiable function.
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At this stage, a question may arise: does working with an arbitrary well-behaved CRS technology really buy substantially more exibility compared to focusing on, say, Kimball's aggregator (9), or another reasonably broad class of production (or cost) functions? We believe the answer is positive, the reason being that our approach allows capturing a rich variety of competition regimes and is exible enough to capture some empirical controversies a narrower model would not.
13 In Section 2.3, we give a mathematically more precise argument in favor of our modeling strategy.
Specialization economies vs complexity diseconomies. We are now equipped to
give precise denitions for the specialization economies and complexity diseconomies. We nd it useful, however, to preface the formal denitions valid for the general case with a brief informal discussion based on the special case of the augmented CES technology (6).
12 To guarantee that a solution to (9) does exist for any n, one should assume additionally that φ(0) ≤ 0,
is a power function, we obtain the CES specication as a special case of (9).
13 See Table 1 and the discussion below in Section 3.2.
In equation (6), when suciently negative, ν is a measure of the magnitude of the complexity eect: a larger number of intermediate inputs being simultaneously combined within the same production process can lead to a reduction in aggregate output (we come back to this issue immediately below). To be more precise, complexity diseconomies are said to occur i ν < 1−1/ρ, otherwise specialization economies take place. The logic behind these denitions is as follows: evaluating the total output Y given by (6) at a symmetric vector of inputs,
14 we obtain Y = n ν+1/ρ q. The above inequalities keep track of whether Y increases more or less than proportionately with n. The baseline case described by (5) corresponds to ν = 0, hence the baseline CES technology always exhibits specialization economies.
In order to extend these denitions to any symmetric CRS technology, we consider the behavior of F at a symmetric outcome, i.e. when q i = q for all i ∈ [0, n]. Denote by ϕ(n) 
In other words, specialization economies occur i ϕ(n)/n increases with n, or, equivalently, when the elasticity of ϕ(n) exceeds 1:
Otherwise output of the nal good decreases with the intermediate inputs' range. In the latter case, we face complexity diseconomies. TFP function. Since ϕ(n)/n captures how total output of the nal good varies with input diversity, the total quantity of the dierentiated input employed being xed, we nd it reasonable to dub ϕ(n)/n the TFP function. Since this function will play a crucial role in what follows, we choose to treat it as one of the two fundamental primitives of our model (the second one to be dened below). We may equivalently dene specialization economies as the situation when the TFP function increases in n. Specialization vs complexity: a dual description. We now come to developing a dual description of the trade-o between specialization and complexity. To do so, we observe that when the price schedule for the intermediate inputs is symmetric, i.e. when p i = p for all i ∈ [0, n], then the nal-good producer will purchase all inputs in equal volumes: q = Y /ϕ(n).
As a consequence, total cost equals Y pn/ϕ(n), while the price index at a symmetric outcome
Combining (11) with our denition of specialization economies, we may conclude that the price index decreases (increases) with the range of inputs i specialization economies (complexity diseconomies) take place.
In order to provide some intuition on the nature of the trade-o between specialization economies and complexity diseconomies, consider the following examples. For the standard CES technology (5), the TFP function is a power function of the form ϕ(n)/n = n 1/(σ−1) .
Since σ > 1, specialization economies take place. The same is true for any production function described by the Kimball's exible aggregator (9) with φ(0) = 0, for which ϕ(n)/n = φ −1 (1/n). On the contrary, the translog production function (7) exemplies complexity diseconomies. Indeed, evaluating (7) at a symmetric input vector, we nd that ϕ(n) = 1 for all n > 0. As a consequence, (10) is violated, which means the presence of complexity diseconomies. Finally, the dual approach allows to see that the translog cost function (8) describes a technology which is, in a sense, a borderline case: as implied by (8) and (11), the TFP function ϕ(n)/n is identically one. Thus, neither specialization economies nor complexity diseconomies occur, i.e. these two forces fully balance each other.
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Proposition 1 below summarizes the main properties of all the example production functions mentioned above. Proposition 1.
(i) Kimball exible-aggregator technologies (9) satisfying φ(0) = 0 exhibit specialization economies;
(ii) the translog production function (7) generates complexity diseconomies; (iii) the translog cost function (8) shows exact balance between specialization economies and complexity diseconomies.
Proof. See Appendix 2.
This result demonstrates that non-pathological CRS technologies with dierentiated inputs exhibit versatile behavior. Proposition 1 also highlights the exibility of our approach, which encompasses a wide variety of such technologies. In particular, our way of modeling production technology is more general than the one proposed by Kimball (1995) Demand for inputs. The market demand rm i faces stems from the rst-order condition for cost minimization in the F-sector:
where Φ(q i , q) ≡ ∂F/∂q i is the marginal product 17 of input i, while λ is the Lagrange multiplier of the rm's program (2) . It follows from the envelope theorem that the value of λ equals the marginal production cost, i.e. λ = ∂C /∂Y for all Y and p. Combining this
with (3), we obtain the following inverse demand schedule for input i:
Weak interactions. As stated in the introduction, market interactions between producers of inputs are crucial for our results. For a better understanding of the nature of these interactions, a further inquiry on the properties of the marginal products Φ(q i , q) is needed. First, Φ(q i , q) decreases in q i , which is a straightforward implication of diminishing marginal returns. This property means that inverse demands (13) are downward-sloping.
Second, Φ(q i , q) does not vary with individual output q j of any rm j = i, given that the outputs of rm i and all the other rms (except j) remain unchanged (see Appendix 1 for details). This second property has a far-reaching implication: input-producing rms are not involved in truly strategic market interactions, but rather in weak interactions, meaning that the individual impact of each rm on the demand schedules of its competitors is negligible.
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In other words, it is the aggregate behavior of rms that determines the market outcome, as no single rm has per se enough market power to strategically manipulate the market. This is typical in existing monopolistic competition models and is in the line with Chamberlin's large group assumption.
For the sake of illustration, consider again the CES case. The marginal products are given by 17 Formally, the partial derivatives ∂F/∂q i are not well-dened in the case of a continuum of inputs, which may seem to be an obstacle for working within a framework where the functional F is non-specied. It turns out, however, that putting slightly more structure on the space of input vectors q potentially available for the nal good producers makes things work as if the marginal products were well-dened. See Appendix 1 for technical details. 
As implied by (14) , in the CES case Φ is downward-sloping in q i , while the demand shifter A(q) is invariant to individual changes in q i .
Firm i faces the inverse demand schedule (13) and seeks to maximize its prot. Formally, rm i's prot-maximization program is given by
where P (p) is the price index, which now plays the role of a market aggregate, as it includes all the information on market prices relevant for rm i's prot-maximizing pricing decisions.
In line with the idea of weak interactions, individual changes in rms' prices have a negligible impact on P (p). In other words, each I-rm takes the value of P as given. Hence, (15) may be restated as
where P may now be treated as a parameter.
The rst-order condition for (16) is given by
Furthermore, given the mass n of I-rms, the quantity prole q must satisfy the labor balance condition
which equates total labor supply to total labor demand.
The second-order condition, as well as technical details of possibly multiple solutions, are discussed in Appendix 3.
The role of σ(n). The rst order condition (17) for prot maximization may be recast
where η is the marginal product elasticity:
At a symmetric outcome, when p i = p and q i = q for all i ∈ [0, n], (19) boils down to
where σ(n) is dened by
Because σ(n) is a key ingredient of our model, further comments on this function are needed. First of all, 1/σ(n) represents the prot-maximizing markup, hence σ(n) may serve as a measure of the degree of product market competition. Thus, the behavior of σ(n) with respect to n shows how the toughness of competition varies with rm-entry. In particular, σ (n) > 0 would mean that competition gets tougher when more rms enter the market, which is probably the most plausible case, though not the only possible one.
Second, as stated by (22), σ(n) is also the inverse marginal product elasticity. In other words, σ(n) keeps track of whether the marginal product decreases at a higher or lower rate when the intermediate good becomes more dierentiated. Finally, σ(n) also reects the degree of product dierentiation. Indeed, note that in the CES case σ(n) = σ is constant, σ being the elasticity of technological substitution across inputs. Hence, the higher σ, the less dierentiated the intermediate good is. In the non-CES case, σ(n) also yields an inverse measure of product dierentiation, which now varies with n. It can be shown that σ(n) is, in fact, the true elasticity of technological substitution across inputs 19 evaluated at a symmetric outcome.
Before proceeding, a comment is in order on why σ(n) is independent of q. This is due to the CRS assumption, just like in Bilbiie (2012) the analogous property of σ(n) on the consumption side is due to the homotheticity of preferences. The marginal product Φ(q i , q) is positive homogenous of degree zero (see Appendix 1 for a formal proof ), and so is η(q i , q). Hence, varying q in (22) evaluated at a symmetric outcome under any given n does not shift the right-hand side of (22) . As a result, σ(n) depends solely on the number of rms.
The pricing rule (21) implies that competition gets tougher (softer) in response to entry of new I-rms when σ(n) increases (decreases). Recalling that 1/σ(n) is the protmaximizing markup, we may rephrase this as follows: competition may be either markupdecreasing or markup-increasing. Which of the two scenarios comes true is fully determined by sector F's demand for inputs. Under the CES technology prot-maximizing markups are unaected by entry of new I-rms. Under the translog technologies, the prot-maximizing markups are given by:
Translog production function Translog expenditure function
Hence, both these technologies induce markup-decreasing competition. Finally, when the production function is given by (9), we have 
In this case, competition is markup-decreasing i the elasticity of φ (·) is an increasing function, otherwise it is markup-increasing.
The TFP and the elasticity of substitution as the fundamental primitives of the model
We have seen that the TFP-function ϕ(n)/n and the elasticity of substitution σ(n) determine the key properties of, respectively, the F-sector and the I-sector behavior. For this reason, we choose to treat these two magnitudes as the fundamental primitives of the model. Such a choice will prove to be safe, as both the taxonomy of competition regimes (Section 3) and the necessary and sucient condition for EIRS to emerge (Section 4) will be given in terms of these two functions.
We now come back to justifying the level of generality we choose to work on (see the discussion following equation (9)). At this level of generality, the TFP function and the elasticity of substitution may be viewed as two independent ingredients of our approach, in the sense that the information about one of them is generically insucient to recover the other, which makes both of them the true primitives of our model. Focusing on a more specic class of technologies would imply a non-trivial relationship between the two.
To illustrate this point, consider the family of production functions described by Kimball's exible aggregator (9) . In this case, the TFP function is given by
while the elasticity of substitution satises (23) . As a consequence, the two fundamentals are linked via the aggregator function φ(·), which allows unambiguously recovering one of them from the other by means of reverse engineering (see Appendix 4 for technical details).
Moreover, Kimball's aggregator cannot capture some very simple and intuitive ways of the elasticity of substitution's potential behavior. In particular, it can be shown (see Appendix 4) that there exists no aggregator function φ(·), such that the resulting elasticity of substitution were of the form σ(n) = 1 + βn, i.e. linear in n. 
Entry and the market outcomes
In this section, we focus on studying the consequences of horizontal innovation (or, equivalently, the entry of new input-producing rms) on market outcomes. We fully characterize the behavior of the economy in response to entry and highlight the fundamental role of the relationship between the TFP function and the elasticity of substitution in shaping various competition regimes.
Equilibrium for a given number of I-rms
Because the nal output is consumed only by workers, product market balance suggests that Y = wL. This is possible only when the price index P equals 1. Indeed, rms' prots are given by (1 − P )Y . Hence, if P < 1, each rm would supply innitely many units of Y . On the contrary, if P > 1, total supply of the nal good is zero, since no rm is willing to start production under negative prots.
Combining P = 1 with (11) pins down the equilibrium price for the intermediate inputs at a symmetric market conguration:
The intuition behind (25) is as follows. If the price for inputs exceeds ϕ(n)/n, then the supply of the nal good, hence the demand for inputs, are equal to zero. Consequently, rms producing intermediate goods will reduce prices in order to attract at least some demand.
If, on the contrary, prices are lower than ϕ(n)/n, the supply of Y will be innitely large, and so will be the demands for inputs, which would lead to an increase in prices.
As implied by (25) , at a symmetric equilibrium, the input price increases (decreases) with the number of rms n in sector I when specialization economies (complexity diseconomies) occur (see Section 2.1). This is so because the right-hand side of (25) is exactly the TFP function. Equation (25) may seem puzzling, as it implies that market interactions in sector I are fully irrelevant in determining input prices.
21 As a matter of fact, on the one hand it is absolutely true that the game between input producers depends crucially on the market structure, and so do the prot-maximizing prices when the number of rms is endogenous (see Section 4.1 below). On the other hand, however, input-producing rms accurately anticipate the equilibrium value of the price index, which is determined outside sector I. Namely, it is driven to P = 1 by (i) perfect competition in sector F, and (ii) the correctness of the intermediate rms' expectations. In other words, under the assumption that the number of input-producing rms is given, things work as if these rms were price-takers, even though they are actually price makers. We conclude that this property is a distinctive feature of 21 Moreover, observe that (25) is fully independent of our assumption that sector I is monopolistically competitive. This relationship, indeed, would hold under any market structure which allows for a symmetric equilibrium (e.g., under symmetric Cournot or Bertrand oligopoly). models a lá Ethier (1982) compared to models of monopolistic competition a lá Dixit-Stiglitz (1977) , where the nal good is dierentiated.
It is also worth mentioning that, because the labor market is perfectly competitive, the I-rms take the wage w as given. Thus, the role of the equilibrium wage in this context is to align prot-maximizing prices with (25) .
We now determine the equilibrium wages and aggregate nal output, along with the equilibrium output per-rm. Combining (21) with (25) and P = 1 yields
Furthermore, plugging (26) into the product market balance Y = Lw, we obtain:
Equations (26) and (27) are important because they suggest a decomposition of equilibrium wages and the aggregate nal output (up to the coecients 1/c and L/c, respectively)
into the product of the competition eect captured by [σ(n) − 1]/σ(n), and the specialization/complexity eect captured by ϕ(n)/n. The former increases with n i σ (n) > 0, while the latter increases if specialization economies prevail over complexity diseconomies.
Finally, the per-rm output q * (n) is determined from the labor balance condition (18), which takes the form
at a symmetric outcome. Clearly, q * (n) = (L − f n)/(cn) always decreases with n.
The impact of entry on prices, wages, and markups
In our model, prices, wages, and markups are all endogenous. Putting together (25) , (21), and (26) Proposition 2. In the framework of the model presented, competition is (i ) priceincreasing (price-decreasing ) i the F-rms enjoy specialization economies (suer from complexity diseconomies); (ii ) markup-decreasing (markup-increasing ) i σ (n) > 0 (σ (n) < 0); and (iii ) wage-increasing (wage-decreasing ) i the following inequality holds (does not hold):
Proof. Claims (i) and (ii) follow, respectively, from (25) and (21) . The equivalence of dw * /dn > 0 to (29) , which is implied by (26) , proves part (iii).
The intuition behind Proposition 2 is as follows. Whether competition is price-decreasing or price-increasing is determined solely by the properties of the TFP function ϕ(n)/n. In contrast, the behavior of markups in response to entry can be fully characterized in terms of the elasticity of substitution σ(n) across input varieties. Finally, both ϕ(n) and σ(n) play a role in determining the impact of entry in sector I on the equilibrium wage. The condition (29) states that, for the market outcome to be wage-increasing, it must be that either TFP, or the elasticity of substitution, or both grow suciently fast in n.
Two more comments are in order. First, getting a bit ahead of our story, we say here that (29) , which involves both ϕ(n) and σ(n), yields a necessary and sucient condition for EIRS to emerge (see Proposition 3 in Section 4). Hence, information about the TFP function is insucient to detect the presence of scale economies: one also needs the elasticity of substitution which captures the market interactions between I-rms.
Second, we believe that Proposition 2 also highlights a considerable dierence between our results and those recently obtained by Zhelobodko et al. (2012) . These authors nd that the additional entry of rms leads to a reduction or hike in markups depending solely on how the elasticity of substitution varies with the individual consumption level. However, in their setting markup-decreasing competition is also price-decreasing and (because labor is chosen to be the numeraire) wage-decreasing, and vice versa. In our model, this is not necessarily the case. To show this, we nd it worth contrasting visually our results about the impact of I-rms' entry on prices, markups and wages across dierent types of production functions. Table 1 : The impact of entry on prices, markups and wages for dierent types of production functions Table 1 shows that under the translog cost function prices are neutral to entry, while markups (wages) decrease (increase) in response to a larger number of rms. In the CES case, both prices and wages increase in response to more rms entering the intermediate input market, while the markup remains unchanged. Finally, with a translog production function wages remain unchanged when new rms enter, while both prices and markups fall.
These ndings highlight the key role of the interaction between the specialization/complexity eect and the competition eect in determining the nature of market outcomes.
How can the results summarized by Proposition 2 and Table 1 To sum up, a considerable amount of empirical work tends to suggest that larger markets exhibit higher prices, lower markups, and higher wages. Table 1 reveals that neither the CES production function, nor any of the two translog technologies can fully capture this pattern. What kind of production function would be able to do that? Proposition 2 suggests a qualied answer. According to (29) , if competition is both price-increasing and markupdecreasing, then it is also wage-increasing. Hence, any production function that exhibits both specialization economies (nϕ (n)/ϕ(n) > 1) and increasing elasticity of substitution (σ (n) > 0) generates price-increasing, markup-decreasing and wage-increasing competition.
In particular, any Kimball-type production function, such that φ(0) = 0 and the elasticity of φ (·) is an increasing function, does the job.
External increasing returns to scale
This section describes how the interaction between the specialization/complexity eect and the competition eect generates production externalities. Hence, it plays a central role within the whole analysis.
Free-entry equilibrium
We dene a symmetric free-entry equilibrium as a vector (p * , q * , n * , w * , Y * ), which satises (25) , (21), (26), the labor balance condition (28) , and the zero prot condition
Equilibrium number of rms. We rst pin down the equilibrium number n * of I-rms. To do so, we divide both sides of (30) by pq to obtain p − cw p = wf pq , which, using pq = wf + cwq, may be restated as follows:
In other words, at a symmetric free-entry outcome the markup of any intermediate rm equals the share of xed cost in rm's total production cost. This should not come as a surprise, because it is the presence of a xed cost which generates increasing returns to scale, hence grants market power to rms.
Combining (31) with the pricing rule (21) and the labor balance (28), we obtain:
The equilibrium number of rms n * is uniquely pinned down by (32) i the elasticity of σ(n) exceeds −1, which holds when σ(n) is either increasing or decreasing not too fast in n.
In other words, (32) has a unique solution n * when competition is either markup-decreasing or not too much markup-increasing. If this is not the case, then multiple equilibria may arise. However, since we assume that σ(n) is continuous and exceeds 1, (32) has always at least one solution n * > 0, which implies that a symmetric free entry equilibrium always exists.
22
Specialization and competition under free entry. Given n * , using (21) and (30) yields the equilibrium rm's size:
According to (33) , any (f /c)-preserving shock that generates additional entry in the intermediate sector would lead to a hike (a reduction) in rms' size i σ(n) is an increasing (decreasing) function of n.
Plugging (33) into the production function of sector F, we obtain the resulting aggregate production function:
while plugging n * into (26) pins down the equilibrium wage w * :
In equations (34) and (35), the term [σ(n * ) − 1]/σ(n * ) captures the competition eect, which stems from sector I . This term increases with n, hence with the population size L, i competiton is markup-decreasing. The term ϕ(n * (L))/n * (L) describes the specialization/complexity eect and increases with population i specialization economies take place, which is equivalent to price-increaing competition (Proposition 2).
In order to clarify how the degree of competitive toughness may impact the aggregate production function, we observe that total output Q * ≡ n * q * in sector I is given by
22 In order to choose meaningful equilibria when they are multiple, we can restrict ourselves to stable equilibria, i.e. those for which the elasticity of σ(n) evaluated at n = n * exceeds −1.
Equation (36) follows from (28), (32) , and (33). Using (36) , the aggregate production function (34) may be restated as follows:
The rst term in (37) captures the specialization/complexity eect in sector F, while the second term keeps track of the competition eect. In other words, in our framework competition among input-producing rms aects total output of the nal good through the total amount of the intermediate input.
More precisely, equations (32) and (36) there are two sources of EIRS: the specialization/complexity eect and the competition eect.
This explains why using a CES production function may cause some limitations in various economic contexts. To see this in more detail, consider again equations (34) and (35) above. These two equations are basically the same and dier just by a constant term (L/c and 1/c , respectively). When specialization economies take place, the term ϕ[n
increases with n * . As for the competition eect, [σ(n * ) − 1]/σ(n * ), it rises with n * under markup-decreasing competition, and falls otherwise. Therefore, solely in the former case (markup-decreasing competition) is the specialization eect on both aggregate output and wages reinforced by the competition eect. This is no longer true when competition is markup-increasing: in this case, the specialization eect would be weakened by the competition eect stemming from a larger mass of rms entering the intermediate sector. Notice that, if the production function were CES, then the term [σ(n * ) − 1]/σ(n * ), appearing in both (34) and (35), would be constant. As a consequence, the specialization eect would be the only source of external increasing returns to scale in the nal good sector.
How scale economies emerge
We are now equipped to characterize the comparative statics of the free-entry equilibrium with respect to the population size L. Our main interest in this exercise is to reveal how aggregate output varies with L, namely how EIRS in the F-sector emerge.
Under a positive shock in L, the left-hand side of equation (32) remains unchanged, while the right-hand side is shifted downwards. As a consequence, the equilibrium mass n * of rms increases with L whenever the equilibrium is stable (see Section 4.1). Combining this with (34), we nd that at equilibrium the average product of labor,
/n is an increasing function of n, or, equivalently, i competition is wage-increasing.
We can now state the key result of our paper.
Proposition 3. External increasing returns to scale take place i (29) holds, or, equivalently, i competition is wage-increasing.
As discussed in Section 3, what renders competition wage-increasing or wage-decreasing in our model is the interplay between the competition eect and the specialization/complexity eect. Therefore, Proposition 3 stresses the importance of the interaction between the two eects in generating Marshallian externalities. Indeed, by comparing (29) with the necessary and sucient condition (10) for specialization economies to arise, we nd that that the former contains an additional term, nσ (n)/σ(n), which captures the competition eect and is missing in (10) . Hence, (29) and (10) coincide i σ(n) is constant, which corresponds to the standard CES case. This explains why both the endogenous growth and the agglomeration economics literatures have generally explained the emergence of EIRS by appealing solely to the presence of specialization economies. Meanwhile, the role of market interactions among rms in this process has been largely (and perhaps undeservedly) neglected.
As for the relationship between n * and L, our analysis shows that n * increases less (more) than proportionally to L i competition is markup-decreasing (markup-increasing).
Combining this with (34) yields the following result.
Proposition 4. Compared to the CES case, markup-decreasing competition damps the specialization eect, but simultaneously triggers a positive competition eect. Under markup-increasing competition, the situation is reversed. Table 2 summarizes in a compact way our results about the roles that market-size and the interaction between the specialization eect and the competition eect play in determining the equilibrium market-outcome under markup-decreasing and markup-increasing competition: CES production function. In this case, equation (32) is linear, i.e. the number of rms is proportional to total labor supply L. Hence, the competition eect is washed out, and the specialization eect is the only source of external increasing returns. The aggregate production function is given by
.
Translog cost function. Combining (8) with (32) yields βn 2 +n = L/f , which implies n * = 1 + 4L/f − 1 /(2β). In this case, the number of rms grows proportionally to √ L.
This is because, unlike the CES case, competition is tougher in a larger market. Furthermore, as stated by part (iii) of Proposition 1, complexity diseconomies and specialization economies exactly oset each other. Therefore, the competition eect becomes the main force shaping the resulting aggregate production function which is given by
Equation (38) suggests that the average product of labor
In other words, external increasing returns take place. However, the source of these increasing returns is radically dierent from that in the CES case. Namely, agglomeration economies stem here solely from market interactions between rms, while in the classical CES-based models they are generated entirely by technological externalities embodied in the specialization/complexity tradeo.
Translog production function. In this case, the competition eect is even stronger.
Indeed, as implied by (7), (32) takes the form:
which implies that the equilibrium mass of rms is bounded from above by 1/α. In other words, even when population L grows unboundedly, the number of rms the market invites to operate remains limited due to very tough competition. The aggregate production function is given by
Thus, in the case of the translog production function, the resulting technology exhibits constant returns to scale. This result is in line with Proposition 3: EIRS arise only when competition is wage-decreasing, while under the translog production function entry has no impact on wages (see Table 1 in Section 3.2).
A micro-foundation for an S-shaped production function. Finally, we provide a simple micro-foundation for an S-shaped aggregate production function, which has been widely used in growth theory and development economics, especially in the analysis of poverty traps. 
The TFP function underlying (40) is given by
while the elasticity of substitution across inputs is constant and is given by σ = 1/(1 − ρ), just like in the standard CES case. Using (41) , it is readily veried that ϕ(n)/n increases in the input diversity n for all n < 1/(ρb) and decreases otherwise. Hence, the TFP function is bell-shaped, meaning that specialization economies occur when the intermediate input is not too much dierentiated, otherwise complexity diseconomies prevail.
The resulting aggregate production function Y * (L) reads as
According to (42) , increasing returns to scale arise when L is suciently small; otherwise, decreasing returns to scale occur.
Concluding remarks
Using a two-sector model with a perfectly competitive nal good sector, a monopolistically competitive intermediate input sector and variable elasticity of technological substitution across intermediate inputs, we have singled out two sources of EIRS: the specialization/complexity eect and the competition eect. The former is generated within the nal good sector and shows how employing more varieties of intermediate inputs fosters/deters the production of the nal good, while the latter stems from the market interactions among rms within the intermediate input sector. The market outcome is determined by the combined behavior of the TFP and the elasticity of substitution, which are both functions of the input diversity. In other words, the interplay between the competition eect and the specialization/complexity eect plays a key role in shaping the equilibrium properties.
We have fully characterized market behavior in terms of the relationships between the two above eects. This characterization has been useful in clarifying the origins of external increasing returns. In particular, we have shown that, due to the interference of a non-trivial competition eect, the presence of specialization economies is neither necessary nor sucient for scale economies to emerge. This result highlights the limitations of the CES monopolistic competition approach to modeling the scale externalities, which overlooks the relevance of the competition eect, as the level of market power does not vary with the number of rms. Therefore, our analysis points to the need for more work on the role of market competition in shaping agglomeration economies, endogenous growth and other economic phenomena driven by scale eects. Finally, we argue that our theoretical ndings are in line with recent empirical evidence on the behavior of prices, markups and wages with respect to the size of the economy.
A last remark is in order. Our decomposition of scale economies into two components has been done at the theoretical level. However, given the growing amount of applied research aimed at estimating the impacts of TFP shocks and variable markups on the economy, we believe that a similar exercise can also be done empirically. Using our model as a basic setting for structural econometrics would require extensions to the cases of heterogeneous rms, multiple nal-good sectors, and probably also imperfect market structures alternative Lemma. Let F : L 2 → R + be a Frechet-dierentiable functional, which is positive homogeneous of degree 1. Then (i) Φ(q i , q) is positive homogenous of degree zero in (q i , q), and (ii) the Euler's identity F (q) = n 0 q i Φ(q i , q)di, (44) holds.
Proof. To prove (i), rewrite (43) as follows:
F (tq + th) = F (tq) + n 0 Φ(tq i , tq)th i di + • (t||h|| 2 ) for all q, h ∈ L 2 , t ∈ R + . (45) Dividing both sides of (45) by t and using homogeneity of F , we obtain F (q + h) = F (q) + n 0 Φ(tq i , tq)h i di + • (||h|| 2 ) . (46) Combining (43) with (46), we nd that φ(tq i , tq) is a Frechet derivative of F computed at q for any t > 0. By uniqueness of Frechet derivative, φ(tq i , tq) must be independent of t, which proves part (i) of the Lemma.
To prove part (ii), note that (43) implies the following identity:
Using homogeneity of F and Φ, we obtain (44) as the limiting case of (47) under τ → 0.
Q.E.D.
Appendix 2. Proof of Proposition 1.
(i) If a production function satises (9), we have ϕ(n) n = 1/n φ −1 (1/n) .
To guarantee that equation (17) is compatible with prot-maximizing behavior by rms, the second-order condition must hold, which amounts to assuming that the real operating prot [Φ(q i , q) − cw/P ] q i of rm i is strictly quasi-concave in q i for all q.
In order to ensure that a continuum of asymmetric Nash equilibria in the rms' quantity-setting game does not arise, we introduce a stronger assumption: the left-hand side of (17) is decreasing in q i for any q. Imposing this condition is equivalent to assuming that the operating prot of each rm is strictly concave in its output. This assumption holds for the CES and, more generally, for any production function of the type (9) such that − φ (ξ) φ (ξ) ξ < 2 for all ξ > 0.
This rules out the possibility of asymmetric equilibria because (17) has a unique solution q * i (q), which is the same for all rms i ∈ [0, n]. See, e.g., Gorn et al. (2012) for a formal treatment of multiple asymmetric equilibria in a monopolistically competitive setting.
The general solution of (50) is dened as a solution to
where A > 0 and a ∈ R are integration constants, while Ei(·) is the exponential integral dened by
It is readily veried that the right-hand side of (51) is a decreasing function of φ for any given values of A and a. As a consequence, each solution φ(ξ) to (50) is a decreasing function, hence it cannot serve as an aggregator function in (9) .
